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Abstract
A key element in the Department of Defense’s Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner nations in order to share the 
costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) 
utilizes several security cooperation programs to work with partner countries to support Defense Institution Building (DIB), i.e. 
build the capacity of their defense ministries. In addition, the major commands and the Services conduct activities that directly or 
indirectly support DIB objectives. DIB has four primary components—Wales Initiative Fund-DIB (WIF-DIB), Defense 
Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA), and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies 
(DILLS)—but includes all security cooperation activities that develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. 
The primary objective of many existing DIB activities is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces 
subject to appropriate civilian control. This paper addresses the following topics, critical to answering questions about DIB: (1) 
DIB-focused policy goals and program objectives; (2) Criteria for selecting and prioritizing partner nations; (3) A strategy to 
achieve goals and objectives; (4) Harmonizing DIB with other security cooperation activities; (5) Accountability processes and
procedures; (6) Roles and responsibilities.
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1. Introduction
A key element in the Department of Defense’s Strategic Guidance is building the capacity of partner nations in 
order to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. To implement this goal, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy (USD(P)) utilizes several security cooperation programs to work with partner countries to support 
Defense Institution Building (DIB), i.e. build the capacity of their defense ministries. In addition, the major 
commands and the Services conduct activities that directly or indirectly support DIB objectives. DIB has four 
primary components—Warsaw Initiative Funds-DIB (WIF-DIB), Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI), 
Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA), and Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DILLS)—but includes 
all security cooperation activities that develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense institutions. The primary 
objective of many existing DIB activities is to help partner nations develop and manage capable security forces 
subject to appropriate civilian control. This paper addresses the following topics, critical to answering questions 
about DIB: (1) DIB-focused policy goals and program objectives; (2) Criteria for selecting and prioritizing partner 
nations; (3) A strategy to achieve goals and objectives; (4) Harmonizing DIB with other security cooperation 
activities; (5) Accountability processes and procedures; (6) Roles and responsibilities.
2. DIB goals, objectives and guidance
Although an element of security cooperation, DIB is unique in that it focuses specifically on partner nation 
defense institutions. It is a relatively new concept, first introduced in 2010 to unify security cooperation activities 
targeting partner nation defense institutions. DIB integrates four major security cooperation programs: DIRI, WIF-
DIB, MODA, and DIILS. These are distinct programs with unique objectives and oversight mechanisms. Thus, 
unifying them, along with other DIB activities at the Combatant Commander (CCMD) level, presents a challenge. It 
requires an understanding of DIB at all levels, from the highest strategic policy level down to the country team. In 
response to the research question “How can we determine appropriate goals and objectives and what role should 
partner nations’ requirements have?” we: (1) tracked existing DIB-related goals and objectives from national policy 
through the DIB programs to project level activities; (2) evaluated the DIB goals and objectives as outlined in draft 
Defense documents;(3) identified gaps that exist in DIB objectives and guidance; and (4) provided recommendations 
on how to address the identified gaps. 
The major DIB goals and objectives are. DoD must work with partner nations to develop capabilities and 
capacity of other nations’defense institutions in order to:
x Advance U.S. interests and strategic goals by promoting: good governance; transparent and accountable oversight 
of security forces; rule of law; respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; and the foundation 
for democratic governance where possible.
x Prevent or mitigate instability, conflict and authoritarian governance.
x Increase partner nation responsibility for their security needs and contribute to regional/international security and 
stability.
x Improve sustainability and impact of other U.S. security cooperation investments and activities.
x Support stronger partner nation and U.S. whole-of-government and/or ministry-to-ministry relations.
x Improve bilateral defense relations and understanding between the United States and other nations, defense 
institutions and armed forces.[1]
3. Selecting and prioritizing partner nations
Next, we focus on processes for selecting and prioritizing partner nations and activities for DIB investments. At 
the CCMD level, selecting partner nations is generally simple, as CCMDs usually know which nations are willing 
and able to accept assistance in developing their defense institutions, which will benefit from such investments, and 
which engagements are consistent with OSD guidance. Although selection within a CCMD is not that difficult, 
allocating resources to the selected countries can be problematic in that it requires the implementation of a 
prioritization process.
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For DIB programs, partner nation selection can be more difficult given that, with the exception of WIF-DIB, their 
mandate is generally global. DIB engagements—and security cooperation engagements more broadly—are often 
demand-driven, with DIB programs receiving requirements from OSD, CCMDs, Country Teams and, at times, other 
DIB programs. There is no common process across DIB programs for selecting among these requirements, and as a 
result, each program has developed its own selection process.
There is however guidance on partner nation security sector assessment in the form of a Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD-23) mandated requirement to “[develop] common standards and expectations for assessing Security 
Sector Assistance (SSA) requirements.”[2] The objective is to gain an understanding of the partner nation’s security 
environment, its willingness and “[its] propensity to implement and sustain assistance, improve institutional 
capacity, and build capabilities in the context of U.S. country objectives.”[3]
In this paper, we begin with a short section on the partner nation security sector assessment process; part of the 
SSA planning process. Nations selected for DIB investments can be assessed to determine if its security 
environment can absorb and sustain DIB engagements. Next we examine formal and informal factors determining 
country DIB engagements for all sectors of the DIB enterprise, from DIB programs to CCMDs. We then review the 
prioritization processes that DIB programs have put into place to prioritize among OSD, CCMD, and Country Team 
requirements. Finally, we examine howCCMDs prioritize partner nations and select the most appropriate activities 
for each of them.
3.1. Security sector assessment
The security sector assessment process evaluates a candidate nation’s need for security sector assistance 
investments that apply equally to DIB investments. It does not establish criteria for selecting the partner nation nor 
for prioritizing selected nations, but rather it identifies gaps in security that might include deficiencies in ministerial 
level management.Several directives, frameworks and planning processes are associated with security sector 
assistance: (1) PPD-23 is designed to improve how the U.S. government enables partner nations’ ability to “provide 
security and justice for their own people and [respond] to common security challenges; (2) the SSA planning 
process describes how to incorporate interagency assessments, planning, and evaluations into interagency planning 
processes; (3) the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Interagency SSA Framework document 
provides a common foundation for government agencies to assess partner nation security and justice sectors and to 
recommend reforms as needed; and (4) the Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool (DSART) provides the 
assessment team with a set of questions designed to capture qualitative and quantitative assessment of a partner 
nation’s defense sector, its institutions and processes, and its capacity to carry out operations.[6]
3.2. Formal and informal factors determining country DIB engagements
Country Security Cooperation Plans (CSCP) and Integrated Country Strategies are the two key documents that 
provide guidance to CCMDs and DIB programs on country DIB engagements. Within the CCMD, the Theater
Campaign Plan (TCP) is the primary instrument used to inform the CSCP. Overall TCP guidance begins with the 
National Security Strategy (NSS) and flows through the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and the Joint 
Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP). The GEF specifies security cooperation in several focus areas. The most relevant 
DIB areas include conducting institutional capacity building activities that enable a partner nation to better: (1) 
manage human resources; (2) develop and sustain military capabilities; and (3) manage military justice.[4]In 
general, CCMDs should consider two major factors for country selection: (1) U.S. interests in the region, and (2) 
partners’ willingness and ability to absorb and maintain the assistance.[5]Four additional elements help determine 
where country DIB engagements should take place. First, DIB planners must take into account requirements from 
other U.S. agencies. Second, they need to know what DIB activities other countries are undertaking in order to avoid 
duplicating these activities and, ideally, be able to complement them. Finally, high-level interventions either from 
the U.S. or partners nation can also trigger DIB events.
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3.3. DIB program selection and prioritization process
We examined the different prioritization schemes that DIB programs have developed. There is no agreed 
common selection and prioritization process for all DIB programs: each has put into place specific processes to 
address requirements and prioritize DIB recipients. However what all have in common is a set of first principles that 
apply equally to the CCMD partner nation selection and prioritization process: (1) consider OSD priorities to 
include the regional Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense (DASDs); (2) consider CCMD priorities; (3) consider 
country team priorities; and (4) select from among the countries that comprise the intersection of the three interests 
those that are willing and able to absorb DIB investments.
3.4. CCMD partner nation selection and prioritization
CCMDs play a key role as an interface between country teams and Security Cooperation Officers (SCO), who 
channel requirements from partner nations, and the various DIB programs. CCMDs also coordinate with DIB 
program directors to fine-tune the implementation of DIB activities in their areas of operation (AOR). CCMDs are 
particularly useful in this role because of their comprehensive knowledge of the different countries in their AOR, 
which gives them the ability to prioritize among partner nations as well as among activities based on partner nations’ 
needs. Although all CCMDs select and prioritize countries according to their respective TCPs, they also use various 
additional criteria—especially when prioritizing countries. 
4. Harmonizing DIB and DIB-related activities
U.S. security cooperation activities, DIB included, rely on a mosaic of programs that are managed and 
implemented by multiple providers, of which the Depart5mkent of Defense (DoD) is but one. Other providers 
include other U.S. agencies; bilateral partners of the United States; and regional and international organizations. The 
resulting picture is exceedingly complex, making it difficult to keep track of the many activities taking place 
simultaneously in a partner nation. We examined what security cooperation programs beyond DIILS, DIRI, MoDA 
and WIF-DIB engage in DIB efforts. The variety of such programs represents an opportunity for the U.S. 
government but also increases risks of conflict and overlap. Although a number of coordination mechanisms exist 
they have limitations.
We identified 49 security cooperation programs that contributed to DIB at some level. We defined three levels of 
DIB engagements ranging from simple familiarization to full defense management. Table S.1 lists the type activities 
included at each level and the number of programs in each.
Two datasets were accessed to identify the DIB-related security cooperation programs included in the 49 
identified: the RAND 2013 database of SC programs and Department of the Army Pamphlet 11-31. [7][8]
Table 1.DIB Programs by Level.
Level Definition Type of activities Number of programs
Level 3
Defense management
Organizational change or 
prolonged interaction
Liaison officers
Ministerial advisors
Creation of new institutions
Ministerial engagement
12
Level 2
Defense professionalization
Forming defense elites Education and strategic training 
(including acculturation)
Conferences
Seminars and workshops
25
Level 1
DIB familiarization
Military-to-military 
engagements on defense 
institution topics
Table-top exercises
Wargames
High-level contacts
Information and data exchanges
12
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5. Assessment: Monitoring, tracking, and evaluation
Once goals and objectives have been established along with a strategy in place to achieve them, the next question 
is: “How are we doing?” Are we making progress toward achieving these goals and objectives and how do we 
measure the effectiveness of DIB engagements? The problem is that DIB activities are generally episodic whereas 
their effect is designed to be persistent and sustainable. Hence planners are faced with measuring the effect of a 
single engagement on the long-term goal of say, to strengthen a partner nation’s defense resource management. 
Often we resort to measuring inputs such as the number engagements with the partner nation, the number of 
seminars, the number of students from partner nations attending regional center classes, etc. As tempting as this may 
be, inputs are not outcomes and the outcome is what we must assess.
We address this rather difficult topic by examining how DIB engagements are monitored, evaluated and tracked 
both by the DIB programs, the CCMDs and to some extent by the regional centers. We first discuss monitoring and 
tracking DIB engagements before dealing with the heart of the assessment process: evaluation. 
5.1. Monitoring
Monitoring is a continuing activity that provides regular feedback and early indications of progress or lack 
thereof in the achievement of DIB engagement objectives. Monitoring examines the actual performance against 
what was planned or expected. It generally involves observing the implementation processes, strategies and results. 
An important feature of monitoring is the opportunity to recommend corrective measures.
5.2. Tracking
Tracking in this context is essentially effective bookkeeping: some formal process to record and update essential 
information about DIB engagements. There are two main databases used to track DIB, and more generally, security 
cooperation, engagements: the Concept and Funding Request (CFR) database—mandatory for WIF funded 
engagements and the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (GTSCMIS) now 
required for tracking all security cooperation engagements.[9]
5.3. Evaluating the DIB programs
In most cases, the DIB programs plan engagements in close consultation with the CCMDs and therefore the 
objectives of these engagements are consistent with those of the CCMD. Engagements may be demand driven, i.e., 
requests for certain engagements from CCMDs, country teams or other in-country or regional sources. Or they can 
be program driven as when the DIB program creates a periodic plan. In either case the objectives of the engagement
are developed and these serve as the basis for the assessment of progress toward achieving long- and short-term 
goals. 
5.4. Evaluation at the CCMDs
Defense Institution Building and Security Cooperation in general are managed by various staff elements within 
the CCMDs. In addition, some commands view DIB differently. For example, The African Command (AFRICOM)
views DIB as strengthening operational forces and at the Pacific Command (PACOM) it is considered a minor 
subset of Security Cooperation. In general, the evaluation of DIB engagements at the CCMDs is part of an annual 
process that is linked to the development of the TCPs and the subsequent CSCP or Country Cooperation Plans 
(CCP). The basic objectives for the region and each country are articulated in these plans and therefore form the 
basis for evaluation. The objectives are generally in the form of lines of effort, activity or operation and in some 
cases are subordinate to intermediate military objectives. Although similarities exist, each command has its own 
method for evaluating the contribution of the various DIB activities to achieving its desired end states.
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6. Roles and responsibilities
In this section we discuss roles and responsibilities of organizations involved in DIB as defined in various 
Defense documents, and examine the application of DIB from the policy to the execution level. We discuss linkages 
and gaps in DIB oversight and program management at policy, program, and project levels, and present 
recommendations on how to improve the process. We also suggest mechanisms to improve OSD guidance through 
to the project execution level.
6.1. Policy level oversight
TheDASD for Security Cooperation is responsible for providing DIB guidance to regional offices. There is a 
coordinating relationship between State, OSD(P), and the Joint Staff (JS). State Department’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs is the branch responsible for coordinating with OSD(P) and the JS. According to PPD-23, the State 
Department has the lead on planning, execution, and assessment of all SSA activities (which includes DIB). For the 
regional centers, the policy level relationships are mainly with the regional and functional DASDs. The regional 
DASDs provide guidance on “who to teach,” while the functional DASD-SC provides guidance on “what to teach.” 
The objective of the centers is to build partner capacity through courses, seminars, workshops, research and 
academic outreach. The FY13-14 Priorities for the Regional Centers for Security Studies directs the shift in regional 
center priority from prevailing in today’s wars to preventing, deterring, and prevailing against future threats. RC 
priorities are to: (1) promote better understanding of the U.S. system of government and defense; (2) communicate 
and share regional reactions to U.S. policies and report these to OSD(P); (3) build approaches to partnering that 
engage the ‘whole of government; (4) contribute to the Department’s effort to codify lessons learned from the past 
decade’s experience with counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance; and (5) assist in 
horizon-scanning and the identification of future trends [10]
6.2. Program-level guidance
In practice, various organizations have oversight and control of the DIB programs. From the policy perspective, 
DASD-SC retains guidance, directive, and program management control of all the DIB programs. However, it does 
so through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Center for Civil-Military Relations 
(CCMR)provides administrative support to DIRI and WIF-DIB, but not MoDA and DIILS. MoDAreceives strategic 
direction from DSCA and DASD-SC. DSCA and CCMR have a coordinating relationship, although this relationship 
is not defined. CCMR develops the strategy for engagement, and is responsible for the selection and prioritization of 
all DIRI country engagements.
6.3. Project-level guidance
The relationship between DIB programs, CCMDs, and regional centersvary by geographic area. Although unique 
and tailored relationships are ideal, competitive relationships between DIB, CCMDs and RCs are not. Thus, it is 
beneficial to consider what successful relationships look like and try to mirror or parallel them across commands. 
For example, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is a good example of workable relationships. DIRI has a very 
close relationship with SOUTHCOM because of a representative in on its staff who closely coordinates with DIRI, 
and includes DIRI events and activities in their TSCMIS and SOUTHCOM planning, execution, and assessments of 
activities. 
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7. Findings and recommendations
Our study developed several findings—not all requiring remedies, but for those that did we list them here in 
Table 2. The first column lists our findings and the second column records our recommendations.
Table 2.Findings and Recommendations.
DIB Goals Objectives and Guidance
DIB objectives align closely with GEF SC 
focus areas and PPD-23 goals
To ensure DIB goals and objectives focus at the institutional level, revise DIB objective 2 to 
read: “Prevent or mitigate instability and conflict by building capacity at the institutional 
level, encouraging democratic governance.”
Inadequate dissemination of guidance inhibits 
understanding of DIB 
The most recent version of the GEF should be disseminated and accessible to all DoD parties 
who need it. 
Understanding of DIB differs among CCMDs A better understanding of DIB to include the enterprise goals and objectives can be affected 
by: (1) improved documentation; and (2) adding a DIB “familiarization” module as part of 
ODC/SCO and Defense Attaché (DATT) training at the Defense Institute of Security 
Assistance Management (DISAM).
Timeline for developing and revising goals and 
objectives is not compatible across levels and 
organizations
The timeline for the development and the revision of DIB-related goals and objectives should 
be aligned to become more consistent with higher policy-level objectives. 
Involvement of partner nations in setting DIB 
objectives at the CCMD level is inconsistent
Partner nation’s level of capability and willingness to accept the assistance offered should be 
taken into account in determining the U.S. level of involvement.
The DIB role of the Special Forces Command 
(SOCOM) is unclear
Since SOCOM is a global command it may be a good model for global DIB strategy 
development. 
Partner Nation Selection and Prioritization
DIB programs have developed processes for 
selecting countries and prioritizing their 
activities.
In selecting DIB partner nations and in selecting DIB projects within selected nations, all DIB 
programs should consult OSD
DIB programs should consult the implementation plan for the SSA planning process written 
in response to tasking in PPD-23
DIB programs should consult routinely with the CCMDs and Regional Centers
DIB programs should consult with the Country Teams when prioritizing DIB projects to be 
implemented within the country
DIB programs should consult with other DIB and SC programs to de-conflict operations as 
much as possible
DIB Programs should consult the host nation to determine its needs before deciding to select 
the country for DIB investments and what activities to implement
The CCMDs are in the best position to assess 
the relative importance of countries in their 
AOR with respect to DIB investment priorities 
CCMDs should ensure that security cooperation goals and objectives include DIB
CCMDs should consult with OSD, the country teams, the partner nations and other agencies 
when selecting countries for DIB investments
CCMDs should establish some form of “scoring” process to prioritize DIB investments
CCMDs should include DIB and SC LOEs in the annual TCP update process
CCMDs should consider development of a TSCP
The PN selection process at the DIB Program 
levels could use more structure
CCMDs should consider a structured approach to PN selection by developing an index 
systems consisting of standard indices of security and economic well-being
Harmonizing DIB and DIB-Related Activities
More and better coordination mechanisms are 
needed.
Create a clearinghouse either from the current entities that oversee one or more DIB 
programs, or ex-nihilo
Increase the impact of CCMD conferences
Charge DSCA with managing all DIB programs
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DIB Goals Objectives and Guidance
Assessment: Monitoring, Tracking and Evaluating DIB Activities
Tracking individual DIB events is complicated 
because of the number of systems used. 
The Global TSCMIS should be adopted and its use enforced at all DIB programs and CCMDs
Among the DIB programs and the CCMDs, 
monitoring DIB engagements is uneven.
To the extent possible, objective monitoring processes should be implemented for all DIB 
activities
Although the entire DIB community has 
expended considerable effort at developing 
suitable methods to measure the progress of 
their investments, there is some unevenness in 
the approaches. 
A clear articulation of goals and objective through the GEF-JSCP-TCP process at the CCMD 
level is needed
CCMDs should develop a strategy aimed at achieving goals and objectives over a long period 
of time
Evaluation processes should focus on both the effectiveness of DIB investments and how well 
they are performed
Suitable standards or criteria should be established to evaluate both the effectiveness and 
performance of DIB activities
A mechanism needs to be in place to terminate or significantly alter an ongoing DID activity 
if necessary
Roles and Responsibilities
Roles and responsibilities in the DIB 
community are not adequately defined: they are 
either not defined at all, or the relationships are 
so complex that organizations resort to ad hoc 
relationships based, at times, on personalities.
The DIB Programs should have a role in the annual CCMD TCP and the Theater Security 
Cooperation Plan (TSC)P planning process
The final version of the DODD 5132.03 should clearly define the roles and relationships 
amongOSD, the Military Departments, the Joint Staff, the Defense Agencies, and DoD Field 
Activities.[1]
DODD 5132.03 should also be the authoritative source for defining roles and relationships at 
the program level
Better use of Liaison Officers to coordinate between regional centers and CCMDs is needed
The principle of “unity of command” is lacking 
in the DIB community.
There should be one single entity between OSD and the CCMDs responsible for managing all 
DIB Program activities
State Department
Appoint a DIB Enterprise Director to serve as a bridge linking policy to program to project 
level DIB
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